Inconsistency on Nepal’s Foreign Policy Behavior: Political Instability, Party Ideology, and Regime-Protection Incentives amid Great Power Rivalry

Abstract

Nepal’s foreign policy is shaped by an unusually complex combination of geopolitical vulnerability and domestic political competition. Located between China and India and increasingly engaged with the United States and other Western partners, Nepal faces strong incentives to preserve strategic autonomy while simultaneously securing economic, political, and security interests. Although the Constitution of Nepal establishes an independent foreign policy based on the United Nations Charter, non-alignment, Panchsheel, international law, sovereign equality, and national interest, successive governments have often interpreted and implemented these principles differently. This article examines why Nepal’s foreign-policy behavior has appeared inconsistent amid intensifying Great Power rivalry. It asks three questions: why has Nepal’s foreign-policy behavior been inconsistent; how does the ideology of ruling political parties influence foreign policy; and how do changes in government and governing coalitions affect foreign-policy orientation? Drawing on qualitative analysis of constitutional provisions, government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents, party documents, diplomatic statements, secondary scholarship, and selected cases from Nepal’s foreign-policy history, the article argues that inconsistency cannot be explained by geography alone. Rather, geopolitical pressures are filtered through domestic political instability, coalition changes, party ideology, leadership preferences, and regime-protection incentives. Party ideology creates policy predispositions but does not mechanically determine foreign policy. Changes in government matter because they alter the political actors, coalition incentives, leadership preferences, and interpretations of national interest that process external pressures. The analysis of the periodical political developments and policy response illustrates how similar structural pressures can produce different policy choices under different governments. The article contributes to small-state foreign-policy scholarship by demonstrating that structural vulnerability does not automatically generate consistent balancing or non-alignment; domestic political institutions and regime incentives mediate the external environment. It concludes that greater foreign-policy consistency requires cross-party consensus, stronger institutionalization of foreign-policy decision-making, and a clearer separation between long-term national interests and short-term political survival.

Dhakal, B. (2026). Inconsistency on Nepal’s Foreign Policy Behavior: Political Instability, Party Ideology, and Regime-Protection Incentives amid Great Power Rivalry. Shanti Journal, 5(1), 57-81. https://doi.org/10.3126/shantij.v5i1.100812

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